

# SECURE COMPUTATION OF FACE IDENTIFICATION - SCiFI

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**ABSTRACT:-** Secure computation of face identification is recently developed secure face recognition systems that ensures the list of faces it can identify remain private. In this work, we study the consequence of malformed input attacks on the system from both a security and computer vision standpoint. In particular a cryptographic attack that allows dishonest user to undetectably obtain a coded representation of faces on the list, and a visualization approach that exploits this breach, turning the lossy recovered codes into human-identifiable face sketches. Evaluation of the approaches on two challenging dataset with face identification tasks given to the computers and human object

**KEYWORDS:** PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS (PCA), EIGEN VECTOR, EIGEN VALUES

## I. INTRODUCTION

This area of study has great applications in security, as we can use facial identification as a form of biometric identification. Identification is where system compares a single image with the list of stored images and determines if it is a close match. This process is especially useful in surveillance for identifying terrorists, criminals, or missing people from a single shot of their face. Video and camera based surveillance is very common and is found to be useful in fighting crime. On the other hand, the ubiquity of such surveillance is a major concern for the public that feels that its privacy is being violated. Our work focuses on face recognition system, which can automatically identify if some known suspects appear in a large set of images. Such systems can be useful, for example, for automatically searching for suspects in a stream of images coming from public places.

On the other hand, these systems can be misused to track people regardless of suspicious, and rogue operator can even combine data from these systems with a universal database linking faces to identities, such as a database of driver's license photos. The proposed SCiFI system matches images taken by a client camera to a list of images (of potential suspect) which are held by a server. Face identification in SCiFI is based on novel face recognition algorithm that performs very well in terms of applicability to real life images and robustness to unseen conditions (e.g., different illumination conditions). The matching is done in a privacy preserving way, using efficient methods of secure computation, and does not reveal any information to the parties, except for whether a match was found.



Fig.1 Example

## II. METHODOLOGY

Implementation part of the project involves the following step

### A. Offline processing.

1. Offline processing involves preparation of face part vocabulary. In this stage patches from the public databases are extracted.
2. Computation of appearance vocabulary and spatial vocabulary is also done in offline processing.

### B. Online processing.

Online facial reconstruction involves

1. Finding best matching patches.
2. Face reconstruction using principle component analysis.

### C. Proposed method

Our method consists of two major components. The first is offline stage that builds the facial vocabulary and face subspace from the public database. The second is the online stage that assembles a human face and is done only after a face vector is obtained.

1. **Offline stage:** The face images should come from an external database  $Y$ , which are used to create the fragment vocabularies which can be completely unrelated to the people registered in the server's list. All faces are normalized to canonical size, and the positions landmark features (i.e., camera of the eyes) are assumed to be given. Figure 2 gives idea about what is done in offline stage.




FIG2: OFFLINE STAGE

The figure 2 shows the three major parts of the offline processing stage. At the top of the figure, we build a public face database. Here we show five landmarks indicated by red boxes on each person's face. The red boxes and their centers serve as windows to build the appearance (bottom left) and spatial vocabularies (bottom middle). The whole faces are also used to build the face subspace (bottom right). Given face images in external database, to form appearance and spatial vocabularies  $V_1, \dots, V_p$  and  $D_1, \dots, D_p$  use an unsupervised clustering algorithm (k-means) to quantize image patches and distances. We also use the external database  $Y$  to construct a generic face subspace. The space of all face images occupies a lower-dimensional subspace within the space of all images, as has been long known in the face recognition community. To compute low-dimensional image representations this face can be exploited. In order to "hallucinate" the portions of a reconstructed face not covered by any of the  $p$  patches we exploit a face subspace. Formally, face images in external database  $Y$  consist of a set of  $F$  vectors  $y_1^1, \dots, y_1^F$ , where each  $y_i^1$  is concatenating the pixel intensities in each row of the  $i$ -th image. By computing mean face  $\mu = 1/F \sum_{i=1}^F y_i$ , and then center original faces by subtracting the mean from each one. Let the matrix  $Y$  contain those centered face instances, where each column is an instance  $Y = [y_1, \dots, y_F] = [y_1 - \mu, \dots, y_F - \mu]$ . Principal component analysis (PCA) identifies the ordered set of  $F$  orthonormal vectors  $u_1, \dots, u_F$  that describes the data, by capturing the directions with maximal variance. The eigenvectors of  $1/F \sum_{i=1}^F y_i y_i^T = YY^T$ , sorted by the magnitude of their associated eigenvalues, by the definition the desired vectors are the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix computed on  $Y$ . The top  $K$  eigenvectors define a  $K$ -dimensional face subspace.

2. **Online stage:** The SCiFI protocol can be executed after building appearance and spatial vocabularies. A patch face representing the individual using the indices from the vector will be shown by attackers by reverse engineering. The attacker can estimate the missing regions of the face and return a identifiable human face using our reconstruction technique. Figure 3 provides an outline of the second stage of our visual reconstruction.





Fig 3: ONLINE STAGE

The figure is an overview of the online face reconstruction process. Given a facial vector from the system, we look up each of the patches that were representative of this face. We can then construct a patch face. Using the patch face as the initial input, we then iteratively project into the face space to synthesize a complete human face. Finding a best matching face: Now we can define how to form patch face reconstruction. For each face of  $p$  facial parts, the cryptographic attack defined above yields the  $n$  selected appearance vocabulary words and  $z$  selected distance words. This encoding reveals which prototypical appearance and spatial was most similar to those that occurred in the original face specifying indices into public vocabularies. Thus, we map retrieved corresponding quantized patches and distance values for each part into an image buffer. We take the  $n$  quantized patches and randomly select one of them to reconstruct the appearance of a part  $i$ . We average the  $z$  distance values for spatial information of part  $i$ . We place the patch into the buffer relative to its center, displaced according to the direction  $o_i$  and the amount given by the recovered quantized distance bin. For example, if  $n = 4$  and  $s_i^a = \{1, 3, 7, 19\}$ , we look into the patches

$\{v_1^i, v_3^i, v_7^i, v_{19}^i\}$ , and compute average then, if say  $z=2$ , and the associated distances are  $s_i^s = \{4, 10\}$ , we average patch's center at  $\frac{1}{2}(D_4^i + D_{10}^i) \cdot o_i$ , where the buffer's center is at the origin. To get the patch face reconstruction we repeat this for  $i=1, \dots, p$ . Figure 5.3 shows an example patch face. To reverse the SCiFi mapping the process uses all information available in encoding.




We first reconstruct the quantized patches based on the binary encoding (left), and then expand the reconstruction to hallucinate the full face given those patches (right).

### III .PROPOSED ALGORITHM

#### Principal component analysis: Based on Face Reconstruction

The remainder of the face image based on the constraints given by the initial patch face is estimated by second stage of our reconstruction approach. We can exploit the structure in the generic face subspace to hypothesize or estimate values for the remaining pixels because these regions are outside of the original SCiFi representation. Associated uses of subspace methods have been investigated for dealing with partially occluded images in face recognition for example, to reconstruct a person wearing sunglasses, a hood, or some other strong occlusion before performing recognition. Here we want to reconstruct portions of the face that are missing, with the end goal of creating a better visualization for a human observer or a machine recognition system. We adopt a recursive PCA technique presented in, which is used to compensate for an occluded eye region within an otherwise complete facial image. Firstly we will initialize the result with our patch face, and then project iteratively into and using public face subspace reconstruction is done each time adjusting the face with our known patches. Comparable to experiments in, our process makes substantially greater demands on the hallucination, since about 60%-80% of the total face area has no information and must be estimated. Figure 5 gives a sketch of this technique.



**FIG 5: PCA ALGORITHM**

The figure 5 illustrates the iterative PCA technique. The input is the patch face and the output is a fully reconstructed face. Given a novel face  $x$ , to obtain its lower-dimensional coordinates in the face space we project face onto the top  $K$  eigenvectors (so called eigen faces). Particularly, the  $i$ -th Projection coordinate is:

$$w_i = u_i^T (x - \mu),$$

For  $i=1, \dots, K$ . The resulting  $w = [w_1, w_2, \dots, w_k]$  weight vector specifies the linear combination of eigenfaces that best approximates (reconstructs) the original input:

$$\hat{x} = \mu + U w,$$

Where the  $i$ -th column of matrix  $U$  is  $u_i$ . In our case simply reconstructing once from the lower dimensional coordinates may give a poor hallucination, since many of the pixels have unknown values (and are thus initialized at an arbitrary value of 0). However, by bootstrapping the full face estimate given by the initial reconstruction with the high-quality patch estimates, we can continually refine the estimate using the face space. This works as follows: Let  $x^0$  denote the original patch face reconstruction. Then, define the projection at iteration  $t$  as

$$W^t = U^T (x^t - \mu),$$

the intermediate reconstruction at iteration  $t + 1$  as


$$\hat{x}^{t+1} = \mu + U w^t,$$

and the final reconstruction at iteration  $t + 1$  as

$$x^{t+1} = \omega \hat{x}^t + (1 - \omega) x^{t+1},$$


Where the weighting term  $\omega$  is a binary mask the same size of the image that is 0 in any positions not covered by an estimate from the original patch face reconstruction, and 1 in the rest. We cycle between these steps, stopping once the difference in the successive projection coefficients is less than a threshold:  $\max(|w_i^{t+1} - w_i^t|) < \epsilon$ .

#### D. Sequence Diagram




*Fig.6 SEQUENCE DIAGRAM*

#### IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION



*FIG 7 LOGIN PAGE*

Login window where authenticated users can login with his username and password.




*FIG 8 MAIN GUI WINDOW*


Fig 6 shows the representation of a main graphical user interface window.

Clicking on PREVIEW CAMERA button turns the camera ON and displays image from camera. Clicking on Get Face Snapshot button crops the face and fragments the image into nose, mouth and eyes. Each fragmented part can be registered by clicking on Register Image button. It will be encrypted and stored in database






*FIG 9 GUI OF FRAGMENTED FACE SCIFI-SERVER*



*FIG 10 REPRESENTS THE ENCRYPTED FORM OF FACE*

Clicking on Register Image button saves the image with given name in database. Clicking on Display Database button displays images in database in encrypted format as shown above.



*FIG 11 ENCRYPTED IMAGE OF THE PATCH*

Clicking on Display Patched Faces button displays the patched images in encrypted format. When we click on display database we get the encrypted form of face stored in database as shown in fig.





*FIG 12 SHOWS THE GUI OF CLIENT SIDE*



*FIG 13 SHOWS IMAGE OF A SUSPECTED PERSON*


Clicking on PREVIEW CAMERA button turns the camera ON and displays image from camera. Clicking on Get Face Snapshot button crops the face. When we click on DECRYPT IMAGE button we get decrypted images stored in database as shown below. Clicking on TEST FACE button calculates Euclidian distance between the stored image and captured image and displays matching patches. Euclidian distance of 0.12382 is fixed. Distance below this value will be match and above this will not be considered as match. Then, PCA(Principle Component Analysis) reconstructs and displays face. If there is a match, user will be notified with popup message "Suspected Image".






*FIG 15 GUI FOR NO MATCH*

In above snapshot, Euclidian distance is more than threshold value of 0.12382 and therefore, it is not considered as a match.



*FIG 16 REPESENTS GUI FOR BROWSE DATA*

Clicking on Browse Data button opens 'Select Files to Open' window, where we can browse and select images to compare as shown below.



## V.CONCLUSION

We present a novel attack on a secure face identification system that control detailed perception from both security as well as computer vision techniques. While the SCiFI system appropriately claims security only under the honest but-curious model, we have demonstrated the dangerous consequences of such a system when exposed to a dishonest adversary. Our vision contributions are to stretch the limits of subspace-based reconstruction algorithm for visualization of severely occluded faces.

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